A woman assessing the wealth of a potential husband may observe some, but not all, of his wealth. She may screen, leading to status consumption and wasteful gift giving. The screening activity is costly both for the potential husband, and for the woman, as it reduces the wealth of the man she may marry. A sound observable …nancial background ('old money') bene…ts the candidate but also the woman, and reduces wasteful status consumption spending. Also, ageing and attractiveness of the woman a¤ect the equilibrium conspicuous spending pattern.
Introduction
Courting Mrs. or Mr. Right is often costly. In the epic poem 'The Song of the Nibelungs,'courtship rules are straightforward and simply announced by the courted lady named Brunhilde. 1 She screens, marrying only a candidate who emerges victorious in a …ght with her. Candidates who fail may pay with their lives. Courtship rules may now be less violent, but courting is still costly. Qualities such as beauty, material wealth, earnings ability, and career prospects matter. 2 Some qualities are easily assessed, such as beauty and physical appearance. But the lifetime income that a man can bring into a marriage is, at least partially, private information.
Overcoming this information problem is costly. Suitors with high unobserved lifetime income may simply wait until this information problem unravels later in life. Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) argue that such a delay may turn courtship into a waiting game -in which the men with low incomes marry early. This approach has the drawback that prosperous candidates need to incur high waiting costs. Another prominent feature of courtship is conspicuous consumption that is at least partially wasteful, but may reveal information about income. A famous example is the engagement ring (Ng 1987 ), but a proof of income may also involve a Rolex watch, a Ferrari, a Hermès handbag, Cartier jewelry or other conspicuous consumption products that the candidate displays or gives to the person he courts. But conspicuous consumption has the drawback of being at least partially wasteful.
3 1 The character of Brunhilde (and the episode we allude to here) in 'The Song of the Nibelungs' di¤ers from a very similar character in Richard Wagner's opera cycle 'The Ring of the Nibelung'or the Volsunga Saga. Therefore, depending on the mythology referred to, she may also be spelled Brunhild, Brünnhilde, Brynhild or Prunhilt. 2 Marriage may be about more than money, income, or wealth. The resource motive, however, …nds much support among evolutionary biologists (e.g., Trivers 1972) . They emphasize the resource capacity that the husband may bring into a marriage and which bene…ts the couple's o¤spring. We follow this tradition, disregarding love and a¤ection as marriage motives for our analysis here. 3 The economic theory on status consumption highlights the instrumental role of conspicuous consumption for attracting a better marriage partner. This instrumental aspect of status lies behind many models of status-seeking. De Fraja (2009) explicitly links utility maximization to the biological problem of …tness maximization. Men face a trade-o¤ between investing in their survival, and conspicuous consumption that signals their quality and thus increases their matching probability. Much of the theory emphasizes the role of status goods as signals of income (Bagwell and Bernheim 1996; Corneo and Jeanne 1997; Frank 1985 Frank , 1986 Ireland 1994 Ireland , 1998 Ireland , 2001 ; Glazer and Konrad 1996; Moav and Neeman 2012) often with consideration of the role of the income of potential grooms in the context of marriage matching.
We consider courtship as a simple mechanism design problem with one-sided incomplete information. 4 One partner's quality is perfectly observed; this partner uses screening tools to assess whether a potential applicant is su¢ ciently wealthy. A common convention which was probably more applicable in the past is that 'she'is sought for her beauty, which is directly observed, whereas a candidate has some unobserved income. The convention has received support by sociobiological reasoning that combines two aspects. The joint production of o¤spring is an important purpose of marriage (Edlund 2006) , and the resources required for raising children are particularly high for humans, compared to other, even closely related species (Diamond 1993 ). For our purpose the convention is not essential, and the gender assignment is only a language convention in what follows. One could even claim that, in modern life, the gender roles and the assignment of relevant qualities to gender is blurred and has partially reversed.
But what remains relevant in courtship is that the beauty …nds the wealthy, and that beauty is directly observable, whereas wealth is not.
We analyze the optimal screening contract for Brunhilde, the person with the observable quality. Her screening problem has several new and interesting features.
First, screening expenditure by a candidate typically also hurts Brunhilde: such spending reduces the resources a candidate can otherwise contribute to the marriage. 5 This cost needs to be taken into consideration when Brunhilde chooses the screening contract. As a result, she will typically require a threshold level of conspicuous expenditure and will marry the candidate if conspicuous consumption is of precisely this amount, but not higher.
Second, our approach can explain why conspicuous spending patterns di¤er widely, even within the same society. Our model explains the observation that, in contrast to people from an 'old money' background, the 'nouveaux riches' ‡aunt luxury goods when it comes to marriage matching. Indeed, a candidate with 'old money' will be 4 Matching, marriage and partnership is a complex issue with many aspects. For instance, men may incur debt to provide a dishonest signal of their desirability as a mate (Gallup and Frederick 2010) . Kruger (2008) …nds that men who spend more than they save are likely to have more sex partners compared to more frugal men. Conspicuous goods may signal not the desirable qualities of a partner but rather the opposite: interest in status goods is triggered by feelings of powerlessness Galinsky 2008, 2009 ) or a need to restore one's self-worth (Sivanathan and Pettit 2010). These and many other aspects are beyond the scope of the analysis here, which focuses on one important information problem. 5 Screening by Brunhilde for a strong husband, as in the epic poem 'The Song of the Nibelungs,'
is also costly for Brunhilde if their …ght dilutes his (and also her) strength, or if he or she gets hurt while …ghting.
requested to spend less money conspicuously compared to a self-made man who made it into the class of 'new money'but has little observable wealth. 6 Candidates with 'old money' enjoy major advantages: they need to spend less money conspicuously, and they are acceptable to Brunhilde even if their expected overall quality is lower.
Third, an increase in Brunhilde's attractiveness can make the outcome more wasteful. Screening the candidates becomes more di¢ cult for a potential bride who is particularly sought after (for example, because of her beauty or personality or due to a highly male-biased sex ratio). Men of all incomes may be willing to spend so much money conspicuously, generating a con ‡ict with the potential bride's aim to marry a man who brings large resources to the marriage.
Fourth, we can draw conclusions about the e¤ects of ageing. Finding a husband or a spouse is a two-sided matching problem that may take many iterations and many periods. 7 Much of our analysis focuses on a static choice problem of two given partners and the problem of incomplete information. We discuss, however, how this partial problem can be embedded in a dynamic game. The analysis predicts a negative correlation between Brunhilde's age and the level of conspicuous consumption which she requires from a successful candidate.
Several papers relate to our analysis. Our paper may be seen as taking a new perspective on the argument put forward in Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993), discussed above. We address the likely implications of Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) for our results in section 4. Asymmetric information and a direct link between status consumption and marriage markets is considered by Pesendorfer (1995) . In his model, wearing the latest fashion trends increases the probability of a match with a highquality partner. He aims to explain fashion trends, not the mating process. Thomas (2013), modeling relationships, focuses on the price of a single status good, identifying a critical price above which a separating equilibrium emerges. Corneo and Jeanne (1998) study the e¤ect on aggregate savings of the timing of a status contest over a two-period life cycle. Matching takes place in social interaction groups that belong either to a high or low income class. Therefore, conspicuous consumption can improve matching, by allowing high-income men to be identi…ed. Moav and Neeman (2012) 6 Whereas, in our model, conspicuous consumption declines with observable income, in Moav and Neeman (2012) conspicuous consumption declines with observable human capital. They argue that the poor and the nouveaux riches do not hold diplomas or professional titles and therefore rely on conspicuous consumption to signal their success. 7 See, e.g., Coles (1997, 1999 Using an overlapping generations model, they endogenize the level of information (i.e., human capital) which is available in addition to the signal via conspicuous consumption. Furthermore, our paper relates to signaling models that account for information on the sender's type, which is available in addition to his signal. 8 We extend previous theoretical work in three ways: (1) screening: the commitment choice by the principal about how she would interpret possible signals, (2) the analysis of signals that are costly both for the agent and for the principal, and (3) partial observability (…nancial assets or family background may be observable, but other characteristics that also a¤ect a male's income prospects are not).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews some empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the framework of the model and derives the bride's sorting strategy in a static setting. Section 4 addresses dynamic implications. Section 5 discusses and concludes.
Empirical evidence
Several elements of our model are supported by empirical evidence, including the importance of material resources for male success in courtship, the use of conspicuous consumption to signal wealth, the role of beauty, and the consequences of ageing in courtship.
Much evidence shows that wealth matters for courtship success. In ancient Egypt 2002), apart from the endogenously chosen signal, the receiver observes some noisy information about the sender. This extra information is unknown to the sender when he chooses his signal. Equilibria are found in which medium types signal to distinguish themselves from low types. In contrast, high types choose to countersignal, i.e., they do not signal as they are con…dent that they will not be seen as low types. Fremling and Posner (1999) distinguish between two components of status: one is a …xed endowment, and a second is a¤ected by signaling. They discuss how, within the same income class, individuals endowed with high status choose to signal less compared to those individuals endowed with low status.
an evolutionarily bene…cial courtship strategy. 9 In line with this argument, whereas men put greater weight on physical attractiveness in mates, women place more value on intelligence, favor men who grew up in wealthier neighborhoods (Fisman et al. 2006) , and prefer men with a good earning potential (Buss and Barnes 1986 ). This …nding is substantiated by a …eld experiment on a Chinese online dating website where women of all income levels visited pro…les of high-income males more often, and where women's visits to these pro…les were an increasing function of their own income (Ong and Wang 2013 ). Experimental evidence indicates that men in a mating mindset are more likely to pay attention to status goods (Janssens et al. 2011 ) and intend to buy more luxury products (and less functional products). In contrast, for women the mating motive triggers not conspicuous consumption but conspicuous benevolence (Griskevicius et al. 2007 ). 10 Moreover, women interpret men's signaling behavior correctly, and women …nd men who buy status goods more sexually attractive (Sundie et al. 2011 ). Also, women in the fertile phase of the menstrual cycle pay more attention to status products (Lens et al. 2012 ).
In China, much consumption of luxury products is reportedly driven by conspic- analyses. Financial assets did not mediate the relationship between employment and the probability of marriage, but did predict marriage. Higher car values were found to increase the probability of getting married relative to the probability of beginning to cohabit. 9 For a comprehensive survey of consumer behavior from an evolutionary perspective, see Griskevicius and Kenrick (2013), who discuss so-called fundamental motives such as attaining status, and acquiring and keeping a mate. Pan and Houser (2011) also summarize evidence from experimental economics and evolutionary psychology explaining gender di¤erences in pro-social behavior. 10 The role of women's conspicuous spending in relationships is studied in a experiment by Wang and Griskevicius (2014) , who suggest that women use luxury products to signal their partners'commitment to them to deter romantic rivals. They …nd that women's looks were unrelated to their likelihood of being married.
Hamermesh and Biddle, however, give evidence that below-average-looking women are disadvantaged in the labor market; they are also disadvantaged in the marriage market, as they get married to men with lower earnings abilities. In addition, Bereczkei et al. (1997) examine traits o¤ered and demanded in lonely heart advertisements. Two of their …ndings are particularly relevant to our paper. First, women who described themselves as physically attractive were more demanding, that is, more likely to require traits such as 'wealthy'and 'having private house'compared to women who did not describe themselves as physically attractive. Second, the …nancial and occupational status required in a new partner were increasing in the physical attractiveness the women o¤ered. Similarly, a study of lonely heart advertisements …nds that female advertisers o¤ering physical attractiveness look for a larger number of traits in a potential partner compared to women not o¤ering cues of physical attractiveness (Waynforth and Dunbar 1995).
Regarding age, Waynforth and Dunbar …nd that whereas men become more demanding with age, women become less demanding. 11 Alternatively, a woman may avoid disclosing her age in personal advertisements. Pawlowski and Dunbar (1999) conclude that these female advertisers try to present themselves as younger than they really are to be more demanding in what they look for in a prospective partner. Furthermore, consumption of conspicuous goods strongly decreases with age (Charles et al. 2009 ).
An explanation suggested by our model is that women searching for husbands become less demanding as they age. Findings by Voland and Engel (1990) are in line with this argument. Using demographic data from historic parish registers to study the relationship between women's age at marriage and suitors'ownership of land, they …nd that younger women were more likely to marry well situated men. Voland and Engel interpret these …ndings as evidence that women followed an age-dependent mate selection maxim that read: "If you are young, be very choosy and marry only a high-quality mate. The older you become, the more you must reduce your standards concerning your marriage partner!" (Voland and Engel 1990, p.146).
11 Bereczkei et al. (1997) …nd, however, that the proportion of women demanding traits associated with high wealth and high status is constant across age groups.
Assumptions
We consider an unmarried woman who seeks a wealthy husband. We name her Brunhilde. Suppose she meets one potential partner. This candidate i would like to marry Brunhilde. She agrees or not. The candidate is drawn randomly from a given set of possible candidates. He has two sources of (lifetime) income. Income may be interpreted in a wide sense here and may include components that have a monetary equivalent, including aristocratic title, connectedness, a good family background, etc. Candidate i's total present value of lifetime income is
The income component n i is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on the 
Candidates may face a liquidity constraint, which would somewhat qualify our results.
In a …rst approach we assume that such a constraint does not bind. Before observing any characteristic or choice by a candidate, Brunhilde can o¤er a screening contract.
This contract is denoted as a function
It states that Brunhilde will marry the candidate with probability p(c i ; m i ) if this candidate i has an observable income m i and displays a status consumption of c i . Brunhilde speci…es such a probability as a function of c i and m i . Note that the acceptance probability can depend on the observable values c i and m i only, that m i is exogenous, and that the candidate chooses c i . As seen from (3), we limit attention to deterministic The cost to a candidate of conspicuous consumption c i when his income is
This cost function satis…es an important single crossing property: the cost for a given level of conspicuous consumption is higher for a person with a lower income. 14 Overall, a candidate's expected utility is
12 Brunhilde might bene…t by making the acceptance probability increase smoothly with c i . But a random acceptance choice need not be ex-post incentive compatible, and may need commitment, which is di¢ cult to obtain in marriage markets. 13 As we study a screening model, the uninformed party (Brunhilde) announces how she will interpret and react to the informed party's behavior. In reality, in a face-to face interaction with a candidate she may communicate this reaction in a slightly more subtle way. Depending, however, on the culture, and also thinking of online dating platforms and TV shows, she may indeed be explicit about the screening contract. 14 Broom and Ruxton (2011) also assume this cost function in a signaling game involving evolutionary biology.
Here a is the utility equivalent of the non-monetary bene…t of marriage to Brunhilde. 15 This bene…t occurs with probability p(c i ; m i ). In turn, this probability is given by the screening contract, observable income, and conspicuous consumption. Brunhilde controls the evaluation of candidates. A rejected candidate can consume his income, but does not get a, thereby determining his default utility. It may, but need not, be thought of as the utility of remaining single and consuming his income on his own. Assume that the candidate under consideration has a > 0, ensuring that, ceteris paribus, he would bene…t from marrying Brunhilde. In addition, assume that this a does not dominate all other considerations, or that 17 We may, for instance, think of expensive status goods given Brunhilde, who values each unit of the good only by 1 . Or 15 The non-material bene…t from marriage is given, common knowledge, and identical for all candidates. It is also una¤ected by their income. Experimental evidence, however, …nds that men primed with a large sum of money adjust their mating strategy; that is, they increase their dating requirements -particularly for physical attractiveness (Yong and Li, 2012) . Similarly, evidence from lonely heart advertisements suggests that men with more resources make higher demands about physical attractiveness (Bereczkei et al. 1997; Waynforth and Dunbar 1995) . Candidates who di¤er in income should therefore also di¤er in their preference for Brunhilde. But if Brunhilde can freely observe a, the heterogeneity does not invalidate the analysis here. Relaxing these assumptions leads to a two-sided search and screening problem that we leave for future research. 16 To obtain closed form solutions, we allow the cost of conspicuous consumption to enter into Brunhilde's and a candidate's payo¤s asymmetrically. If, however, the same cost function given in equation (4) also holds for Brunhilde, the comparative static results stated in Proposition 1 remain qualitatively unchanged. 17 Our model can also capture the two extreme cases where Brunhilde also bears the full screening costs ( = 1) and where Brunhilde bears no screening costs ( = 0). The analysis with no screening costs is at the end of section 3.
Brunhilde may enjoy riding in the candidate's fancy sports car. Overall, Brunhilde's payo¤ from marrying a candidate with income x i and conspicuous expenditure c i is
The screening costs a¤ect both the candidate and Brunhilde, in contrast to the standard models of screening. A candidate always bears the screening costs imposed by conspicuous consumption described by (4) . In addition, Brunhilde dislikes high conspicuous consumption because it reduces what is left for joint genuine consumption or child raising.
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If Brunhilde rejects the candidate, she receives her default utility v. This utility may be determined, for instance, by the quality and frequency of future candidates, and by her rate of time preference. For the moment, assume that v is exogenous;
we determine the optimal screening contract for this exogenous v. We will discuss in section 4 how changes in v a¤ect Brunhilde's behavior, how one could determine v endogenously in a dynamic game with a sequence of candidates, and how v may change under continuing search. The functional forms used in our model require that
Next, we describe the choice problem of candidate i with observable income m i for a given screening function. We consider deterministic screening functions p(c i ; m i ) :
[0; 1) [0; 1) ! f0; 1g that map di¤erent choices of conspicuous consumption for a given m i into acceptance probabilities p(c; m i ) 2 f0; 1g. The consumption choice c i by candidate i with income x i (= m i + n i ) determines whether the candidate is accepted by Brunhilde and receives payo¤
or stays unmarried and receives
Among all c i that yield p(c i ; m i ) = 0, the payo¤ maximizing choice is c i = 0. Among all c i that yield p(c i ; m i ) = 1, the payo¤ maximizing choice for the candidate is the 18 We have a successful candidate's income become the joint consumption of the married couple; one interpretation is that these resources are used to raise children and children are a pure public good for them. In a more general consideration, a candidate's present value of income may yield a higher or lower utility to him if he marries than if he does not marry. The assumption that it has the same e¤ect on his utility is mainly for notational convenience. This income net of conspicuous consumption also a¤ects Brunhilde's utility, and it may do so either more strongly or less strongly. Though we assume that the monetary amount a¤ects Brunhilde's payo¤ directly, the results do not change if Brunhilde's payo¤ is scaled by an arbitrary positive factor. 
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Denote this smallest consumption level by c. Note that, for any given c > 0, if the total income x i is at least x, then for some critical total income x the candidate prefers c i = c over c i = 0, and prefers c i = 0 otherwise. This critical x(c) is
Brunhilde may screen the candidate using this condition. Proof. If Brunhilde actively screens, then she maximizes
19 Departures from non-deterministic screening mechanisms may lead to more equilibrium choices.
But as discussed, the credible implementation of non-deterministic screening mechanisms is di¢ cult. The candidate cannot easily verify that Brunhilde indeed chooses a random mechanism with a precisely determined probability other than 0 or 1.
by a choice of x. 20 The …rst-order condition for a local maximum of w s is
Note further that @ 2 w s (@x) 2 = (1 2 a) .
Hence, the function w s is concave for a 1=(2 ). This is where (5) is used. If a < 1=(2 ), Brunhilde's best choice is either the x solving (10) and is a screening optimum, or a corner solution, in which case no screening occurs. Solving (10) for x and using the equality x(c(m i )) = 1 a c(m i ) by (7) yields the value in (8 ). Condition (6) ensures that
The comparative static results follow directly from (8) and by (7):
In ( She could so exclude by choosing a c higher than c(m i ), further increasing the critical income x(c(m i )), making it undesirable for a candidate with an income at x(c(m i )) or slightly above it to choose the required level of conspicuous consumption that would lead to acceptance. Such a strategy, however, would be suboptimal for Brunhilde.
Intuitively, by admitting such inferior candidates to the pool, she lowers the required 20 Rewriting (9) and maximizing with respect to c also yields the result stated in (8) .
level of status consumption c(m i ), admitting low-income candidates to the pool of candidates who are eventually accepted. But it also gives her some bene…t, reducing her utility loss c(m i ) from the wasteful conspicuous consumption made by any candidate she accepts.
In a standard screening framework Brunhilde would bear none of the costs of the signal; that is, she would get x i , rather than x i c(m i ) from a candidate who produces the signal and whom she accepts. But because Brunhilde bears some of the cost of conspicuous consumption, x(c(m i )) di¤ers from the reservation utility v.
Brunhilde's strategy described by (12) is time consistent. Up to the time when
Brunhilde and the successful candidate marry, Brunhilde behaves optimally using all information available to her. 21 She could have chosen a smaller pool of acceptable candidates, simply by increasing c above c(m i ), but such an increase would not maximize her utility. Note also that the deviation (12) does not result from risk aversion by Brunhilde, as her payo¤ has consciously been chosen to be linear in income, but it is an outcome of conspicuous consumption being costly for Brunhilde. Of course, some noble families have dwindling material wealth. But the argument remains valid under dwindling wealth. It is the aristocratic name that is observed, and this name and the family history it stands for is, in itself, the observable asset.
In many societies the title, name or pedigree itself have value, and that can be given some monetary equivalent. Proposition 1 also states that 'old money'candidates need less wealth on average in the equilibrium to be acceptable to Brunhilde. The threshold level of total income that is acceptable for her in the equilibrium is lower for 'old money'than for the 'nouveaux riches.' So, in comparison, the 'nouveaux riches'face two disadvantages in the marriage market. They must spend more on conspicuous consumption to provide the right signal, and they need to be richer on average to be successful, compared to 'old money'candidates.
So far, we characterized optimal active screening under the condition that it is optimal for Brunhilde to set a positive, but not prohibitive, threshold. Next, we explore alternatives to active screening. If Brunhilde has a very high default utility v and observes the candidate's m i , any screening may be a hopeless exercise. A su¢ cient, but not a necessary, condition for no screening is that v > m i + maxfn i g = m i + 1, as the condition implies that the default payo¤ is higher than the payo¤ from marrying the best possible type of candidate. Also, if v is su¢ ciently small and m i is su¢ ciently large, for instance, m i > v, then it becomes a dominant strategy to accept the candidate and ask for c = 0, to minimize the conspicuous consumption cost. Again, this condition is only su¢ cient. In general, which of the three strategies (active screening, outright rejection, and outright acceptance) is best depends on the parameters of the model.
Here we provide some characterization. Recall that Brunhilde has three potentially optimal actions: outright reject, outright accept with c = 0, and actively screen with c(m i ). The maximal payo¤s for these three actions are given by
We can now study Brunhilde's optimal choice as a function of m i and v . The optimal choices for di¤erent regions are identi…ed in Figure 2 .
H1: outright rejection versus active screening:
Rejecting the candidate with observed income component m i independent of his conspicuous consumption is (weakly) superior to active screening if
for all possible cuto¤s x < m i + 1. This condition can be rewritten after rearranging, integrating, and dividing by (m + 1 x) as
Making use of a < 1=2 by (5), the right-hand side in (14) strictly increases in x and attains a maximum at x = m i + 1. Hence, for (13) and with w r < w s (lower-right).
H 2 : outright rejection versus outright acceptance: A second hyperplane is drawn in Figure 2 . It shows the combinations (v; m i ) for which w a = w r , or
This hyperplane separates all combinations (v; m i ) for which w r > w a (upper-left) from those with w r < w a (lower-right). The two hyperplanes H 1 and H 2 intersect for 
For all combinations below this line active screening is inferior to outright acceptance.
Unlike H 1 and H 2 , however, this line only provides a su¢ cient condition. Active screening does not dominate outright acceptance for all points above this line. 
where, by the envelope theorem, A decrease in v reduces w s w a . Once we reach H 2 ( e m i ), we know that w s > w r at this point (we are below H 1 ). Moreover, we know that w r = w a at this point (which lies on H 2 ). Accordingly, w s > w a , implying that Brunhilde will actively screen for Lastly, we can show that H 4 , which separates the range w s > w a from w s < w a , has a positive slope. Note that w a is invariant for changes in v, but increases with m i . As H 4 is an indi¤erence surface with w a = w s , for a proof that its slope is indeed positive we consider the slope of this locus. Using the envelope theorem again and Whether m i is su¢ ciently large for outright marriage, or whether Brunhilde outrightly rejects the candidate, will depend on a comparison between her default utility and the upward potential, i.e., the range of n i , and on the screening costs in an equilibrium with active screening. The screening costs depend on the value of a. For a su¢ ciently large m i and a su¢ ciently narrow range for the distribution of n i , it is likely that Brunhilde prefers a contract that accepts a candidate with c i = 0.
We can also consider Brunhilde's strategy for a su¢ ciently small and for a suf…ciently large marriage premium a. Several factors may a¤ect the size of a. On the macro-level, the shares of males and females in the population may be unbalanced. China's one-child policy is considered to be responsible for a smaller share of women in the population (Hesketh 2009 ). Moreover, out-migration from regions that lack economic opportunities is often di¤erent for men and women, causing gender imbalances: Kröhnert and Vollmer (2012) report that in 2005 the sex ratio for 18 to 29-year-olds was 89 women per 100 men due to disproportionate migration of women from East Germany to West Germany. As studied by Griskevicius et al. (2012) , a male-biased sex ratio a¤ects saving, borrowing, and spending, consistent with evolutionary biological theory predicting the e¤ects of the intensity of competition for mates. When the sex ratio was malebiased, men (but not women) were found to choose more immediate rewards and to discount the future more strongly, to plan to save less, and to be more willing to increase their credit card debt. In addition, when women were scarce, participants -regardless of their sex -expected men to spend more money during courtship, e.g., to buy a more expensive engagement ring.
Proof. For a 1=(2 ) the objective function (9) is convex. There exists no interior solution for the critical income level x. The two possible corner solutions are w r (v; m i ) and w a (v; m i ).
Our last comparative study is on the role of screening costs. Our approach di¤ers from the standard one, as Brunhilde bears a share, , of the cost of the signal produced by the successful candidate. As discussed after Proposition 1, if Brunhilde bears no screening costs, i.e., = 0, she sets the critical income threshold equal to her reservation utility (formally, x = v). 
Dynamic implications
We so far solved for Brunhilde's optimal local strategy if she interacts with one candidate who wants to marry her, with her and the candidate having exogenous default utilities. We determined the optimal mechanism design for her. Her problem may be embedded in a dynamic game, for instance, a sequence of marriage decisions, which continue until she marries. Such a framework typically has a Markov property: Brunhilde's payo¤ from marrying a given candidate depends only on this candidate's conspicuous consumption c i and income x i , but typically does not depend on the sequence of rejections that occurred previously. This independence allows us to consider single marriage decisions in isolation, as we did in section 3, and where the behavior characterizes local strategies as a function of the current candidate's observed income component m i and the candidate's conspicuous consumption.
In a dynamic framework a few further aspects need to be speci…ed. One aspect is the distribution from which the observable income component of subsequent candidates is drawn, how this distribution changes over time, and the frequency with which new candidates show up if Brunhilde rejects the current candidate. Several variables in the analysis may also be interdependent. The arrival rate of new candidates may, for instance, itself be related to Brunhilde's attractiveness. Also, the utility as single and how she discounts the future need to be described.
If the time horizon is long and Brunhilde anticipates a long series of possible candidates following each rejection, all drawn from the same distribution of candidates, then the dynamic problem may be reasonably well described as a stationary problem.
The decision problem in Section 3 can then be seen as the period decision in a dynamic framework with an in…nite number of periods, with one candidate showing up in each period until Brunhilde …nally marries. A possible extension of our framework is to solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in stationary Markov strategies. A formal analysis would require some notation, but conceptually it is clear how the continuation value v is endogenously determined, and is the discounted value of the expected payo¤ which Brunhilde has if she does not marry in a given period but rather waits for future options.
Stationarity need not be an appropriate description. Brunhilde naturally grows older, future candidates may reassess their bene…ts of marrying her, and the ‡ow of further candidates may be …nite and may change its characteristics over time. This changes her default utility of staying single from one marriage decision to the next.
She may feel her biological clock ticking; being older, she may feel a greater urge to …nd a supporting husband soon. For the decision problem analyzed in section 3, these aspects …nd their counterparts mostly in a change in v over time. The e¤ect of such a change for a < 1=(2 ) in the range of equilibrium with active screening is
If her default utility decreases, and if she actively screens, Brunhilde will be willing to marry a candidate with a lower total income, and she will require less status consumption as proof of a candidate's unobservable income. Also, a reduction in v may result in a change of the equilibrium regime. As seen in Figure 2 , a reduction in v may cause either of several transitions. For some values of observed income, Brunhilde changes her behavior from active screening to outright acceptance. For some values of observed income, she changes her behavior from outright rejection to active screening.
For some observed income she changes her behavior from outright rejection to outright acceptance.
The number of future marriage options may narrow over time, thereby reducing v. 23 The pool of candidates may change over time. Candidates will also be older. As 23 Other factors not modelled here explicitly, may also enter into Brunhilde's default utility v. She may earn some income on her own, which may increase over time, and in turn, increase v as Brunhilde ages.
argued by Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) and a 'more realistic attitude toward life,'our theory would explain the pattern as an equilibrium phenomenon among people who are fully rational when they are young and when they are old.
Discussion and conclusions
We studied screening in marriage matching. We focused on one major information problem, asking how it could be bridged e¢ ciently by a screening technology that has an important empirical counterpart: conspicuous consumption and gifts of status goods.
Conspicuous consumption provides information about a possible partner's wealth or prospects. We show that a potential bride can use a simple mechanism: a menu of contracts to sort candidates and thereby induce but also curb conspicuous spending during courtship. This screening device reveals whether a candidate's total income exceeds an optimally chosen threshold. Candidates with income below the threshold give up. Worthy candidates spend a given threshold amount. This threshold does not depend on their total income, but only on the part of their income that is directly observable. Candidates with the same total income but with a larger share of directly observable income need to spend less on conspicuous consumption.
Matching and the choice of marriage partners is a complex matter in which many dimensions play a role and multiple information problems prevail. Information problems may be two-sided, screening may su¤er from commitment problems on both sides, personal characteristics other than wealth or beauty may matter. Also, conspicuous consumption and status gifts are not homogeneous. In a more general model, there may be multiple means to overcome the income information problem and to a¤ect the amount of wealth brought into the marriage; conspicuous consumption and status gifts are two of them. Lastly, a woman may also screen multiple suitors at a time. If they show up sequentially, the history of rejections may matter. Our analysis focuses on incomplete information about a potential partner's wealth. This is one aspect in the matching context which we think is of major importance, showing its important consequences.
As an important departure from standard screening models, our model acknowledges that screening by use of conspicuous consumption is costly not only for the prospective husband, but also for the potential bride. She cares about the income that is available for joint family expenditure and for raising children. A candidate who spends much of his income on conspicuous consumption during courtship will reduce the very income that is available for joint family consumption. Both she and the candidate su¤er from this reduction in family income. Selecting a worthy candidate by his spending on conspicuous consumption is therefore a mixed pleasure: a higher signal, aimed at signaling higher quality, directly reduces the candidate's quality as a husband. In some instances the cost of the signal can be so high even to her that she may avoid using such a mechanism: she may be better-o¤ by making an outright decision about acceptance or rejection of a candidate and base this decision on the part of the candidate's income that is directly observable. Her default utility, the amount of a candidate's directly observable part of income ('old money'), the welfare cost of conspicuous consumption, and how she shares in this cost, are all crucial for her choice of a mechanism.
The formal analysis makes several predictions that …t with casual or anecdotal evidence. In particular, it can explain why conspicuous consumption is discouraged or is very low for candidates with a rich family background or other visible indications of high wealth ('old money'), whereas it is more prominent among the 'new rich.' It also o¤ers a rational choice explanation for lower conspicuous consumption and less extensive gift giving of status goods with courting among older cohorts.
